Coalition Operations: A Compromise or an Accomodation by McConachie, Vicki
XII 
Coalition Operations: A Compromise or an 
Accommodation 
Vicki McConachie* 
{T}1lere is no quandary in the mind of Australia's military leaders whetl we ex-
amine where we might need to be techtlologically; we use interoperability with the 
United States as a benchmark. However, we mllst strike a balance that ensures we 
remain interoperable with bolll techniadly advanced allies and those not as tech-
nically advanced, but no less important, regional and coalition partners. Australia 
successfully led the UN effort in East Timor because it had the ability to flex its 
command and control systems, technology, tactics, techniques and procedures in 
both directions to accommodate coalition partners across a range of technologi-
cal capabilities. We must continue to achieve this balance within a tight budget. 
This will challenge our ingenuity and, I suspect at times, our patience!' 
Legal interoperability is, in many ways, similar to technological interoperability; it is required for nations to operate effectively in coalitions. 
However, legal interoperability is also in many ways more difficult to achieve. 
While it may be relatively easy to persuade those outside the military of the need 
for technological interoperability, it is perhaps more difficult to persuade those en-
gaged in international negotiations that military interoperability should take pre-
cedence over other goals a nation might wish to achieve in becoming a signatory to 
.. Commodore, Royal Australian Navy. The views expressed in this article are those of the author 
alone and do nOI necessarily represent the views of the Australian government, the Australian 
Defence Force or the Royal Australian Navy. 
Coalition Operations: A Compromise or an Accommodation 
a proposed international agreement. This means that military planners, with the 
assistance of their lawyers, must find a practical way to accommodate the various 
legal needs of their coalition partners while ensuring that operations a re not 
compromised. 
In this article I am going to deal with the issues surrounding coalition opera-
tions. I will begin with a brief overview followed by a discussion of some of the 
main constraints, how they are dealt with (both formally and on a practical level) 
and what opportunities we gain from accommodating the differences of our coali-
tion partners. 
Many of the issues surrounding coalition operations are well settled---or at least 
well -furrowed ground. At the heart of these issues is the fact that coalition mem-
bers who come together for a common purpose may not be signatories to the same 
conventions and, even if they are, they may not have a common interpretation of 
the applicable international law. They may view the nature of the operation as be-
ing different in character, one member characterizing the operation as a police ac-
tion, another as a non-international armed conflict and a third as an international 
armed conflict. The coalition partners will certainly have varying obligations under 
their domestic laws and may have quite different domestic political imperatives 
leading to differing policy guidance. All of this must be accommodated to achieve a 
successful mission outcome. It is important to note that if you lose public support 
for operations then political resolve may be undermined, leading to disintegration 
of a coalition. 
On occasion a coalition partner may wish that these differences would have a 
simple resolution. What must be remembered, however, is that these are coali-
tions. A coalition is not a group of client States acting subject to a patron's desires. 
The coalition has come together, usually pursuant to a UN Security Council reso-
lution, and it is composed of sovereign States who have chosen for various reasons 
to act together to pursue interests that may be different, but which will be served by 
their presence in the coalition and the actions that they take while members of that 
coalition. As noted by Rear Admiral Raydon Gates, Royal Australian Navy: 
In coalitions, compatible national interests are and certainly must be present, but 
compatible interests are not necessarily common interests .. . . [I lt follows that within 
the coalition force we immediately have the. potential for a nurn ber of different military 
objectives, reflecting differing national political objectives.2 
Nonetheless a coalition partner may feel that, because of its greater commitment in 
terms of manpower and economic contribution and its ostensible responsibility 
for the success or otherwise of the mission, it should prevail where there are 
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differences of opinion. However, this is not the international reality. Rather the re-
ality is that all States must reach an accommodation that satisfies their national ob-
ligations and interests. 
So does this accommodation lead to a compromise of mission or values fo r the 
State actors? While you could characterize this accommodation as representing the 
lowest common denominator, J that would be quite wrong. In fact, the accommo-
dations should rather be taken as encouraging the partners to look critically at their 
rules of engagement and to carefully consider the impact they have on coalition co-
hesion. It is the accommodation of difference that is the essence of equality" in a co-
alition of sovereign States. 
Key Constraints 
There are several areas of difference that have affected coalition operations or given 
rise to concern between coalition partners over the last decade. These areas include 
• Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims oflnternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1);5 
• Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa 
Convention );6 
• Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights);7 
National law, including the criminalization of behavior on the battlefield; 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;8 and 
National policy. 
Protocol I 
A key area of concern in relation to coalition operations has been identified as Pro-
tocol l. While many nations who have engaged in coalition activities with the 
United States are parties to Protocol I, the United States has not ratified the Proto-
col. This difference in international obligations of itself creates an issue that must 
be reconciled when planning coalition operations. 
In planning operations regard may be given to statements by the United States 
that it follows the principles underlying Protocol I as part of customary law.9 Osten-
siblythis adds clarity to the obligations that the United States considers binding on 
itself. However, the matter is complicated by lack of certainty as to the US position 
in relation to which underlying principles of Protocol l form part of customary 
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international law. In particular, before September 11, 2001 there seemed to be a de-
gree of certainty as to those parts of Protocol l the United States viewed as not 
forming part of customary law. This included such matters as 
• Its applicability to "wars of national liberation"; 
• The prohibition on use of enemy emblems and uniforms during military 
operations; 
• The prohibition on causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
environment; 
The definition of combatant; 
• The prohibition on the use of mercenaries; 
The prohibition on reprisals; 
The definition of military objective; and 
The protection of dams and dykes. 10 
Since September 11,2001, however, there is less certainty as to which provisions 
the United States views as binding on it as embodying customary international law. 
In his article "'England Does Not Love Coalitions' - Does Anything Change?," 
Charles Garraway says: 
It is interesting in reading the so-called "Torture Memos," to find the almost complete 
lack of reference to Additional Protocol I. It is as ifit has been wiped out of the memory 
bank. It is no longer even dear whether the United States accepts such key provisions as 
Article 75 on Fundamental Guarantees. ... This lack of legal clarity causes acute 
problems fo r Allies seeking to work alongside the United States. 11 
Both the difference in formal legal obligations occasioned by some coalition 
partners' being signatory to Protocol I while others are not and the uncertainty as 
to what parts ofProtocol l the United States considers as fo rming part of custom-
ary international law are factors that must be considered in planning for coalition 
operations. 
Ottawa Con ven tion 
The Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines is another point of difference be-
tween the United States and many of its coalition partners. While the United States 
is not a party to the Ottawa Convention, nations such as Australia, the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Japan and the Netherlands, among many others, are parties. 
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Clearly obligations under the Convention must be considered when examining 
the contribution a coalition partner may make. In particular, State parties to the 
Convention undertake 
never under any circumstances: 
(a) To use anti-personnel mines; 
(b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to 
anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines; 
(c) To assist , encourage or induce, in anyway, anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention. 
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-
personnel mines in accordance with the provisions ofthis Convention.12 
In practical terms for coalition operations, the greatest constraint of the Ottawa 
Convention is the prohibition on assisting, encouraging and inducing activity that 
is prohibited under the Convention. This may include such conduct as transport-
ing personnel who have anti-personnel mines in their possession , or refueling air-
craft or ships carl)'ing anti-personnel mines. 
The European Convention on Human Rights 
Likewise the European Convention on Human Rights can impact upon a mem-
ber's ability to undertake certain operations. For example, the European Conven-
tion influenced British reluctance to use lethal force to defend property in Iraq and 
also underpinned its lack of support for the use of the death penalty by Iraqi courts 
during the occupation period. L3 
Domestic Law 
Beyond a nation's international obligations is its domestic law. The actions that a 
nation is prepared to take in a particular conflict or peacekeeping situation are not 
merely an expression of a nation's international obligations. They also reflect do-
mestic law and policy considerations. These matters concerning domestic law are 
not always apparent to coalition partners and unless discussed can be a source of 
uncertainty. 
The uncertainty can be heightened by complicating factors such as how the par-
ticular coalition partner views the character of the operation. The impact of do-
mestic law may vary depending on whether the operation is characterized as 
international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict or policing. 
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An example of the impact of domestic law on operations is given by Captain 
M.H. McDougall, in her article "Coalition Operations and the LaW."14 In examin-
ing the issues surrounding the transfer of detainees between coalition partners, she 
notes that issues of domestic law require consideration-in particular, Section 7 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which may prohibit the transfer of 
detainees to coalition partners where they may be potentially subject to the death 
penalty.ls 
Criminal Offenses 
Another influence on interoperability is the criminalization of behavior on the bat-
tlefield. For example, Australia, as a party to the Rome Statute, has introd uced into 
domestic law a number of offenses to reflect its obligations. 16 These, of course, have 
extraterritorial application. 
Beyond the offenses introduced as a result of the Rome Statute, there is a contin-
uing trend in Australia to make criminal offenses and regulatory regimes I? extra-
terri torial in their jurisdiction. For example, the Criminal Code Act 1995 makes it 
an offense in certain circumstances to cause the death of an Australian citizen or 
resident overseas. IS While the defense of lawful authorityl9 is likely to apply, there 
remains a risk that Australian personnel may be charged when an Australian citi-
zen or resident is killed during operations. 
This increase in offenses with extraterritorial jurisdiction means that com-
manders must increasingly consider whether operations potentially give rise to an 
offense being committed by themselves or their personnel. These offenses could be 
criminal in nature or aimed at such matters as environmental protection and occu-
pational health and safety. 
Damages 
Apart from the criminal law, commanders are increasingly concerned about their 
possible responsibility for civil law claims arising from operations. Indeed in 
March 2008, an Iraqi family commenced an action for damages in the Queensland 
Supreme Court in Australia as a result of an incident in Baghdad in early 2005. The 
family, who was brought to Australia by the Australian government for medical 
treatment, alleges that it was fired upon without warning. While in this instance 
the family is suing the Australian government,20 the case raises questions about the 
personal liability of soldiers who harm civilians during operations.21 
National Policy 
Beyond the law, however, is national policy. This should not be discounted because 
it is essentially the expression of the democratic will. There will always be matters 
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that-while lawful-are unpalatable and government direction to the military will 
be given to express the will of the people. National policy mayor may not be visible 
to coalition partners and therefore may add further ambiguity to the coalition 
relationship. 
How Do We Deal with the Constraints? 
All of these matters-uncertainty over the US view of the principles underlying 
Protocol I , the Onawa Convention, the characterization of an operation, domestic 
law and policy-may contribute to uncertainty as to what action a coalition part-
ner may take. While this lack of legal clarity is a matter that must be addressed in 
the planning of and participation in coalition operations, it is not fatal to effective 
coalition partnerships. The evidence of this is the fact that coalition operations 
have taken place in a number of theaters since September II, 200 1. In spite of the 
differences, effective legal interoperability is very common.22 Accommodation of 
differences is made to facilitate operations. 
The question then is what are the mechanisms that allow this to be achieved? 
Captain Dale Stephens, Royal Australian Navy, notes that legal interoperability has 
been achieved through a number of means, namely, by reservations or declarations 
to treaties and extensive consultation and sharing of military law manuals, as well 
as a psychological will to coalition mission accomplishment and the development 
of multilateral rules of engagement for operations.23 
Declarations 
At the formal level, one mechanism used by nations to manage their varying treaty 
obligations is that of declarations. 
Protocol I 
In relation to Protocol I, declarations have been used to clarify coalition partners' 
obligations. For example, Australia has made a declaration that includes clarifica-
tion as to the Australian understanding regarding the definition of "military ad-
vantage. n24 The effect of this declaration is that, while Australia is a party to 
Protocol I and the United States is not, it is still possible that the approaches of the 
two countries to issues such as targeting can be harmonized. However, while decla-
rations have made it easier to manage conflicting approaches between the United 
States and Australia, it is clear that there are still differences-albeit the precise na-
ture of these differences has been made more difficult to discern in relation to Pro-
tocol l in the post-September I I , 2001 environment. 
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Ottawa Convetllion 
In relation to the Ottawa Convention, Australia has again used a declaration of un-
derstanding. Among other matters, this declaration clarifies that operating with 
the armed forces of States which are not party to the Convention and that engage in 
activity prohibited under the Convention is not, by itself, a violation of the Con-
vention.2$ The effect of the declaration is that Australia can act with States that are 
not party to the Convention in a coalition, provided that Australia does not assist, 
encourage or induce those parties to act contrary to the Convention. Thus, to en-
sure compliance, a party to the Ottawa Convention must be mindfuJ in operational 
planning of what support is requested by the forces of a State that is not a party to 
the Convention and which possesses anti-personnel mines. 
Domestic law and Policy 
RuJes of engagement for members of a coalition can be different as a result of each 
partner's own domestic laws and policy.26 In the area of domestic law and policy we 
must be mindful of our coalition partners' obligations to comply with their domes-
tic laws. To ask them to do otherwise wouJd be to undermine the rule oflaw and to 
fail to respect their sovereignty. As Charles Garraway said, to demand allies act out-
side the law that binds them "wouJd make a mockery of the ruJe oflaw. "27 What we 
can do is to use open dialogue to better understand and accommodate issues of dif-
ference and respect our coalition partners when they decline a mission because of 
domestic considerations. 
General 
All of these differences may be encapsulated in coalition partners' ruJes of engagement. 
As Captain Dale Stephens said in his article "Coalition Warfare: Challenges and Op-
portunities," however, effective interoperability "[ iJn the modem context of 'co all-
tions of the willing' ... means achieving a harmonization of rules of engagement .... "28 
To achieve interoperability at the working officer level requires critical exami-
nation of where the common approach may lie-although it should be noted that 
it is difficuJt to frame ruJes of engagement in circwnstances where government 
policy as to the existing law is either unarticulated or has been the subject of 
changes. So how are these accommodations made at a practicallevei? 
Practical Examples of Accommodation of Difference 
Timor Leste 
There are a number of practical examples of the accommodation of difference pro-
moting effective coalition operations. An example of such a challenge, which has 
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received previous examination by Colonel Mike Kelly in his article "Legal Factors 
in Military Planning for Coalition Warfare and Military InteroperabiHty,nn is op-
erations in Timor Leste in 1999. As leader of the International Force East Timor 
mission, Australia was in the position of needing to forge a coalition to conduct 
stabilization and pacification operations in Timor Leste following militia violence 
that broke out after the vote for independence. Australian planners confronted the 
issue of aligning mission rules of engagement to accommodate all of the participat-
ing coalition States. 
In this operation the mission rules of engagement formed the basis for opera-
tions. These rules of engagement were more expansive than some participating na-
tion's own rules of engagement. The more expansive aspects of the mission rules of 
engagement included provision for the use of up to and including lethal force to 
protect specifically designated property considered essential to the success of the 
mission.30 
This protection of mission-essential property was one of the more contentious 
aspects of the rules of engagement. A key issue was that the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand and Canada viewed this as only being acceptable where a direct association 
with the protection of life could be established.3l Some Australian uniformed law-
yers took an expansive view of the use of lethal force to protect property.32 How-
ever, in a non-armed conflict, it is unlikely that Australian domestic law would 
permit the use of lethal force to protect property alone. Arguably property on 
which human life is dependent could be protected by the use oflethal force . Ulti-
mately mission assignment had to accommodate this difference in views on the 
protection of property. 
Likewise in the subsequent UN mission in Timor Leste, UN rules of engage-
ment were issued. This highlighted the differences between UN rules of engage-
ment and national rules of engagement. These differences presented a challenge 
that required a strategy to accommodate them. Coalition partners were canvassed 
as to their rules of engagement compliance. As expected, some coalition partners' 
national rules of engagement were more restrictive than the UN rules of engage-
ment and they were restricted by their rules of engagement from undertaking cer-
tain tasksY In planning particular operations account was taken of this and 
ultimately the mission was not detrimentally affected by this approach. In the end, 
differences must be accommodated for a coalition to function effectively, thus en-
suring appropriate recognition of the equality of States participating in a coalition. 
Targeting 
While not the only area of difference, a dear area where legal differences arise on 
operations is targeting. This is also an area where accommodation has been made 
243 
Coalition Operations: A Compromise or an Accommodation 
on a number of occasions. The first time that the issue oflegal planning factors im-
pacting on interoperability was significant was in Operation Allied Force in 1999 in 
Kosovo.:l4 According to Colonel Kelly: 
The United States conducted some 80 per cent of the air strikes against the Serbs and 
the Americans increasingly chafed at the legal restrictions that other members 
considered applicable under Protocoll. The situation wascompounded by the fact that 
NATO had no mechanism designed to enforce common legal standards. 
As a result, NATO policy permitted member states to refuse bombing assignments if 
they regarded a particular target as being illegitimate .... In practice. however, most of 
the Serbian targets thaI were rejected .. were subsequently attacked by the 
Americans.35 
This policy by the United States led to friction in the coalition and ultimately to an 
understanding that when you are trying to maintain cohesion in a coalition it is es-
sential that the obligations and limitations of each member nation are well under-
stood.:l6 To fail to understand and ultimately to respect and accommodate the 
restrictions that other nations place upon themselves in coalition operations is to 
risk the coalition. As Dale Stephens stated in his article "Coalition Warfare: Chal-
lenges and Opportunities": 
Just because the United States retains the full legal capacity to attack the types of objects 
prohibited by the Protocol to others does not mean that it will necessarily undertake 
such attacks. Policy imperatives regarding coalition cohesion plainly inform decisions 
concerning attack profiles. 37 
Iraq 2003 
An example of restraint arose in Iraq in 2003. By the time of the operations in Iraq, 
there was a greater understanding of the need to accommodate coalition sensitivi-
ties. This operation represented the first time for Australia that aircraft would de-
liver ordnance under the changed legal environment generated by the 1977 
Protocol J.38 Again referring to Colonel Kelly's examination of coalition opera-
tions. "The American targeting system was shaped by precautions that related to 
the lawfulness of striking individual targets and by a general need to minimise ca-
sualties and damage to vital installations."39 
Targeting in this operation involved a tiered system based on levels of authority 
required for approvals related. among other factors, to the anticipated nwnber of 
civilian casualties and collateral damage.40 While Australia used this system, the 
considerations for Australia took account of differences between itself and those 
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coalition partners not party to Protocol I. In targeting decision-making Australia 
operated according to national rules of engagement. 
To assist Australian commanders planning operations to understand the legal 
obligations of other coalition partners, two matrices were developed---one for law 
of armed conflict and one for rules of engagement, noting that the rules of engage-
ment were more prone to change. The law of armed conflict matrix, for example, 
listed issues such as anti-personnel mines and definition of combatant against each 
coalition partner and the known international obligations of each. The rules of en-
gagement matrix followed a similar form and greatly assisted in reducing the areas 
of apparent difference highlighted by the law of armed conflict matrix.·] 
Where there were differences, they were accommodated by the "Red Card" sys-
tem which allowed a mission to be declined.42 Even in circumstances where a mis-
sion was allocated and agreed, Australian pilots undertaking that mission were 
given the ultimate discretion not to strike a target which they assessed as not being 
a lawful target. This ultimate "Red Card" discretion was used and supported by se-
nior Australian personnel. 
Ottawa 
As previously mentioned, in practical terms for coalition operations the greatest 
constraint of the Ottawa Convention has been the prohibition on assisting, en-
couraging and inducing activity that is prohibited under the Convention. This pro-
hibition meant that air -refueling aircraft in Iraq in 2003 were ordered not to refuel 
any US airframe that was fitted with air-delivered anti-personnel mines, such as 
the scatterable, mixed-munitions GATORS system!3 Clearly the operation of such 
a prohibition would need to be carefully considered and may not be absolute in all 
circumstances. An exception to the rule may be where the safety of the coalition 
aircraft needing to be refueled is at risk. 
Another practical example of an accommodation to ensure compliance with the 
Ottawa Convention while supporting coalition operations with a non-party was 
the transport by coalition partners of US personnel To ensure compliance, com-
manding officers of ships transporting US personnel took measures to satisfy them-
selves that those personnel were not carrying anti-personnel land mines. Provided 
this condition was met, personnel could be transported. 
Opportunities 
While these practical examples may seem to be constraining operations, they in-
dicate an accommodation of the restrictions that coalition partners may have dur-
ing operations. This accommodation of difference also leads to a greater 
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contemplation of the value of any target or objective as against its cost to the overall 
coalition operation. 
It would be wrong. however. to think that coalition operations are necessarily 
limiting. As Rear Admiral Gates said: 
I would not want to leave you with the impression that political divergence always 
offers problems, in fact it often offers opportunities. It may be possible for a coalition 
commander to use the forces of another nation to undertake a task with more freedom 
of maneuver than would be available to their own forces. For example, I experienced 
this in the Red Sea in 1992/93 where Australian ROE give our units greater freedom of 
action. in certain areas, when conducting maritime interception operations with 
coalition partners. This was an advantage to the US commander, who subsequently 
employed RAN units closest to the Straits ofTiran at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba to 
intercept "inspection runners" when required.44 
In employing these innovative solutions, commanders have, of course, to be 
mindful of their individual legal responsibility for actions that they have been directed 
to take. 
This accommodation of the differing obligations of coalition member States, 
like technical interoperability, forces an assessment of how best a State can contrib-
ute to coalition operations. Rather than asking what a State cannot do. the question 
is what it can do; where can it make the best contribution to the coalition and what 
does it need to achieve mission accomplishment within the restrictions placed 
upon it? Ultimately, making these accommodations. whether they seem to be re-
strictive or empowering, reinforces the equality of sovereign States necessary in an 
effective coalition partnership. 
Conclusion 
Legal interoperability in coalition planning and operations, like technical 
interoperability, is essential for mission achievement. As with technical 
interoperability, while we can aim for the perfect solution , diverging national in-
terests will mean that there will continue to be differences among coalition part-
ners that must be accommodated to ensure effective operations. 
This accommodation should not be viewed as being detrimental; rather it has a 
positive effect on the conduct of operations. The process of dealing with differing 
coalition views on the applicable law and policy generates a greater level of self-
awareness and critical examination that improves the way we conduct operations 
and aids adherence to the norms of international law. By and large it is important 
to people who are in the military of a democratic State that they act honorably. It is 
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also critically important for the maintenance of public support of the operation 
that they be seen to act honorably. To fail to understand and ultimately respect the 
constraints that other nations place upon themselves in coali tion operations is to 
fail to treat them as equal coalition partners and to risk profoundly the efficacy of 
the very coalition. 
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